[Opinion] Silencing the Guns? SA’s leadership amid persistent fire

Pretoria’s expanding roles

Yet Ramaphosa’s focus in Ethiopia was not water; instead, he delivered remarks on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) report, declaring South Africa “remains concerned about worsening conditions of conflict, war and instability on our continent.” He also chaired the AU Ad-Hoc High-Level Committee on South Sudan (the Committee of Five, or C5), convening the first Heads of State-level meeting since 2018.

On 11 February, South Africa had been elected to a two-year PSC term (April 2026–March 2028). These roles project South Africa’s diplomatic weight, but the question is whether they command real leverage.

The failure of ‘Silencing the Guns’

The AU’s “Silencing the Guns” initiative, the raison d’être of the PSC and, by extension, the AU itself as the centrepiece of Agenda 2063, was supposed to end all wars on the continent by 2020, as solemnly pledged in 2013. That deadline passed in silence, and today the continent still suffers from persistent conflict: coups have resurged, intra-state violence festers, and millions remain trapped in crossfire. Ramaphosa’s address, delivered against a “Silencing the Guns” backdrop in the assembly hall, was therefore more indictment than inspiration.

On Sudan, he urged warring parties to “lay down their arms immediately, allow unfettered humanitarian access and… embark on an inclusive national political dialogue.” On South Sudan he called for “a ceasefire in all affected states” and “all-inclusive dialogue” ahead of elections now fixed for December 2026.

The 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) remains the official framework towards peace, yet eight years later, implementation crawls. Minister Ronald Lamola’s C5 assessment mission to Juba in January was cast as acceleration; but the frequency of such follow-ups and repeated postponements tell a different story.

Non-African solutions for African problems

During its first decade of existence, AU efforts in Burundi, Darfur, Somalia and elsewhere delivered somewhat material results, and a firm anti-coup line once slowed unconstitutional changes, but that momentum has dissipated. The December 2025 Washington Accord between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, signed under United States (US) facilitation in Washington rather than AU auspices in Addis Ababa, was not a US triumph so much as an African absence. When external actors broker peace in Africa, the AU’s structural frailties stand exposed.

Pretoria positions itself as continental peacemaker, yet violent crime at home now requires army deployment against citizens. The issue had grown so dire that South African businessmen and golfers had to use their opportunity during a Heads of State meeting in the Oval Office in May 2025 to alert President Donald Trump of the realities at home, in hopes that the US may avail itself to assist.

Pretoria’s decision, notified to the United Nations in January 2026, to withdraw its troops from the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) after 27 years, citing the need to “realign resources,” reads less like strategic consolidation and more like quiet retreat from the very regional responsibilities it lectures others to uphold.

Multilateralism without teeth

Ramaphosa acknowledged the “long transition” in South Sudan and the need for pragmatism. The C5 has not met at presidential level for eight years; the R-ARCSS envisions unified forces and credible elections that keep slipping. These are not technical delays but symptoms of multilateralism without teeth.

South Africa’s PSC election and C5 chairmanship hand Pretoria a platform to set priorities. But platforms are worthless without architecture to match: stronger mediation capacity, credible enforcement mechanisms, and the political will to move beyond aspirational declarations and speeches. Consensus diplomacy has limits, and endless exhortations have not silenced a single gun.

If Agenda 2063 is not to become another dusty relic, the AU and its most influential members, starting with South Africa, must confront their own contradictions at home and abroad. The continent’s conscience, and its citizens caught in the crossfire, demand no less.

Article originally appeared here.